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Space Mission, Campaign & 
System Risk Analyses
• Ares V Mars campaign
• CxAT Lunar Surface Systems
• HEFT II campaign to a NEO
• Aquila II
• SWORDS
Agency Risk Methodology & 
Requirements Development
• Liquid/Solid Propellant Study for 
NASA’s Study of Rockets
• CCP requirements development

















































Asteroid Threat Assessment 
Project (ATAP)
• Physics-based impact risk model
• Fragmentation/breakup
• Crater-forming impact








Crew Launch Vehicle Risk Assessment 
& Risk-Informed Design
• Ares I/V integrated LOM/LOC
• SLS abortability
• SNC Dream Chaser mission risk modeling
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Propagation to other 
systems and to 
failure environment 
Abort Initiators  
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failure environment 
Abort Initiators  




























Test Case: 4 Engines + Tanks
• Simple engine model for generic 
launch vehicle platform 
(derived from J2X)
• 32 components: 7 per engine and 
4 tanks
•Main combustion chamber (MCC)
•2 turbopumps: fuel (FTP)
and oxidizer (OTP)
•3 pipes (fuel, oxidizer, hot gas)
•Nozzle
• Between ~1k–6k triangles per 
component
• 3 different initiators: 











• Models failure propagation of debris field 
and blast wave environments
• Consists of component-to-component 
interactions and behaviors given 
initial conditions
• Uses Monte Carlo framework developed 
in C++:
•Execution begins by seeding a failure and letting 
it cascade until propagation ends
•Results include probabilities of component 
vulnerabilities and scenario tracking
• 100,000 realizations run in ~2 minutes on 
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systems and to 
failure environment 
Abort Initiators  



















•Three degrees-of-freedom (3DOF) trajectory 
integration using MISSION code
•Trajectories  calculated for:
– Launch vehicle
– Crew module
– Each fragment of potentially dangerous size
• Initial debris conditions
•Mass distribution based on experimental data
•Velocity distribution
– Experimental and historical data
– Computed results
•Debris Impact risk determined from 





Debris field caused by fragmentation of 
the Ares I CLV during ascent
Strike probability as a function of 




















Many contributors to risk as shown below—too many to exhaustively 
analyze.
!
• Physics-based analysis 
of key risk factors
•External hazards
•Failure environments




• Interactive effects 
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OFF TO THE MOON…
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LSS Background
• In 2004, NASA was chartered 
to return humans to the moon 
and enable long-term 
habitation
•Baseline transportation 
architecture developed during 
the Exploration System 
Architecture Study (ESAS)
•Lunar surface architecture 
concepts developed by Lunar 
Surface Systems (LSS) Project
• Campaigns: 30+ flights 
spanning a decade
• Combined exploration 
architecture driven by safety 
and mission success criteria
What is the probability of 
Loss of Mission (LOM) 
for a lunar campaign?
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•Proposed requirement was to be allocated as reliability 
requirements for Elements
•All systems required to “not fail” over duration
•Approach
•Countered with Availability requirement proposal
•Used sensitivity to scope potential ranges
Lunar Base Loss of Mission
What is the probability of Loss of 





















































Integrated LSS Risk Modeling
Element Reliability Data







































 Upper Bound  95% Percentile  75% Percentile  25% Percentile 





Outpost Availability Sensitivity 
Study
• Model availability as functional 
capabilities within a system
•Multiple suppliers exist from a 
collection of outpost elements
•Pooled capabilities
• Failures go offline and 
successful repair modeled as a 
function of limited resources
•Available repair mass
•Available resources (crew 
presence, EVA time available)
• Sensitivity to understand levels 
needed
Repair assumption plays an 
increasingly larger role over time
What happens with limited 
resupply and repairability?
Average “complete” 
availability days, as a 

















































Diminishing returns by 
increasing repair mass 
Lost availability due to 
insufficient repair mass 
Incremental difference 
between no and small 
repair mass
Sensitivity of available days to constrained repair mass




Reentry Risk from Orbital Debris 
Strike
• What can occur?
•Orbital debris (OD) strike damages thermal protection system (TPS) 
of spacecraft prior to reentry
• What is the severity?
– Compromised TPS may: 
• Increase aeroheating
• Fail to keep substructure 
temperature within safe limits
• Cause structural failure and 
loss of crew (LOC)
• How likely is this outcome?
– Depends on:
• Likelihood of OD strike
• Degree of TPS loss from strike
• Degree of aeroheating
increase
• Margins in TPS and structure
• Dispersions / uncertainties in 



























































































































Haystack flux, 350-600 km
HAX Flux 450-600 km
Catalog Flux 450-600 km





Space Flyer Unit, 480 km
Goldstone radar, 300-600 km
SMM holes






















NASA Oribital Debris Program
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Thermal Protection System Impact
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Uncertainty in Reentry Risk 
Assessment
•Sources of uncertainties
•Orbital debris: OD Environments 
and damage likely to be caused




– Vehicle state and performance
– Structural geometry and material 
properties
– Models (trajectory, aerothermal, 
TPS) and model parameters
•Assessment must carry 















answers to specific 
questions
•Always driven by specific 
application
•Based on traditional 



















Iterative, responsive modeling approach
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FINAL QUESTIONS?
November 2015
